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ABSTRACT 
This article explains the impact of substate nationalism on the political dynamic 
surrounding ethnic kin migration through a case study of Sri Lankan Tamil refugees 
in the southern Indian State of Tamil Nadu. Examples drawn from the migration 
studies literature identify ethnic kinship between refugees and host as an indicator 
of favorable reception and assistance. While this expectation is borne out to an 
extent in the Tamil Nadu case, it is tempered by a period of hostility following the 
1991 assassination of former Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi by an LTTE suicide 
bomber, when the refugees were figured as a disruptive and dangerous presence 
by Tamil Nadu’s political elites. A version of the “triadic nexus” model of kin state 
relations, reconfigured to accommodate the larger political unit within which the 
substate nationalism is incorporated, is proposed as a framework of analysis for 
these events. This can better account for Tamil Nadu’s substate ethnonationalist 
elite’s movement between expressions of coethnic solidarity with the refugees and 
the more hostile, security-focused response post assassination. 
INTRODUCTION 
Separated from northern Sri Lanka by the narrow Palk Straits, the southern Indian 
State1 of Tamil Nadu has been an important destination for refugees fleeing the 
long civil conflict between the Government of Sri Lanka and the Liberation Tigers 
of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). Most arrived from Sri Lanka’s war-torn Northern and 
Eastern Provinces where Tamils form a local majority,  but Tamils from Sri Lanka’s 
multiethnic capital city Colombo are also found amongst the refugees, as well as 
Tamils of Indian origin—the descendants of 
Tamils from south India who migrated as laborers in the colonial era.2 The 
refugees have arrived in Tamil Nadu since the outbreak of the Sri Lankan civil 
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conflict in 1983. Ebbs and flows in numbers have reflected escalations and lulls in 
hostilities, with the population reportedly reaching a peak of around 200,000 in 
the mid-1990s.3 Many refugees have experienced repeated displacement, 
returning to Sri Lanka during ceasefire periods only to be uprooted again when 
violence has reescalated. Most have made the short but perilous journey in small 
boats under cover of darkness, coming ashore near the coastal town of 
Rameswaram, before being dispersed to refugee camps across Tamil Nadu. As of 
late 2010 (when the most recent statistics were provided to the United Nations 
High Commissioner for Refugees [UNHCR] by the Government of India), there were 
almost 70,000 Sri Lankan Tamil refugees living in 112 refugee camps across Tamil 
Nadu, with an estimated further 30,000 living outside the camps amongst host 
communities.4 Since the conclusion of the Sri Lankan conflict in May 2009 refugees 
have begun to return to the island from Tamil Nadu. UNHCR reports that around 
3,500 refugees returned to Sri Lanka in 2010/2011, and at the time of writing, the 
agency is supporting ongoing voluntary repatriation of refugees.5 
The majority of Tamil Nadu’s 60 million-strong population shares a nominal 
ethnolinguistic identity with the Tamils of Sri Lanka. Examples presented   in the 
refugee studies literature lead to an expectation that ethnic kinship be- tween 
refugee and host results in favorable reception and assistance. Mean- while, a 
corrective to generalized applications of this model is offered by literature 
highlighting states’ concern with ethnic kin refugees as harbingers of instability, 
separatism, and conflict, sometimes resulting in a less than warm welcome. But 
how can we account for a scenario where both of these suggested outcomes of 
ethnic kinship between refugee and host are experienced? In such cases, neither 
of the stands of theorization drawn from the refugee studies literature can 
sufficiently explain empirical reality. In Tamil Nadu, the expectation of positive 
reception has been borne out to an extent      but has been tempered by moments 
of hostility when refugees have been rhetorically positioned by political elites as a 
threat to security and stability.  The positioning of ethnic kin refugees as a threat 
commonly emanates from  elites drawn from an opposing or domineering ethnic 
group within the host  state.6  The Tamil Nadu case is striking, as this discourse has 
also emanated   from the very co-ethnic elites whom one could reasonably expect 
to be the refugees’ ardent supporters—Tamil Nadu’s ethnonationalist parties. The 
aftermath of the assassination of former Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi by   an 
LTTE suicide bomber during a visit to Tamil Nadu in May 1991 is treated    in this 
article as a critical moment, resulting in a shift by Tamil Nadu’s political elite from 
sympathetic consideration of the Sri Lankan Tamil refugees as co-ethnics, towards 
a hostile, security-focused response. 
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An alternative framework of understanding for these events than that offered by 
the refugee studies literature is found in sociological thinking around kin state 
nationalism and migration, in particular Brubaker’s influential  model  of  the  
“triadic  nexus.”7  But  the  Tamil  Nadu  case  contains  an additional level of 
complexity. Unlike many examples from the ethnic kin migration literature, the 
destination kin state or, as Brubaker terms it, the “external national homeland,”8 
is not a nationalizing state in its own right. Rather, Tamil Nadu is a substate unit 
situated within the larger entity of India, which promotes its own, at times 
competing, brand of nationalism. Through exploration of the Tamil Nadu case, the 
purpose of this article is to explain how substate nationalism can affect the 
political landscape surrounding co- ethnic forced migration. External national 
homelands occupying a substate position are compelled to consider a nationalizing 
political context beyond the realm of their own ethnonationalist concerns, thus 
prompting responses   at odds with the expectation set up by theorizations of 
ethnic kinship’s impact on migrant reception by co-ethnic elites. 
Methodologically, this research entailed examination of policy decisions and public 
pronouncements by the Tamil Nadu ethnonationalist parties concerning the Sri 
Lankan Tamil refugees. Secondary and media sources are examined alongside 
original empirical analysis of Indian parliamentary proceedings pertaining to the 
refugees. The source data encompassed proceedings of the Lok Sabha and Rajya 
Sabha (the respective lower and upper houses of the Parliament of the Indian 
Union) dating from July 1995 to July 2010; the full extent of transcriptions are 
digitized and available online at the time of research.9 The concern of this article 
lies with Tamil Nadu’s position as a substate ethno-nation subsumed within the 
larger national and political unit of India, so analysis is focused on the political 
discourse of Tamil Nadu politicians in the central political sphere of the Indian 
parliament, which are transcribed and digitized in Hindi and English. Unfamiliarity 
with written Tamil precludes analysis by this author of discussions of the refugees 
within Tamil Nadu’s State Assembly, although this may offer a fruitful avenue for 
other researchers. 
“OUR TAMIL BRETHREN”: TRANSBORDER ETHNIC KINSHIP AND THE SRI LANKAN 
CONFLICT 
Transborder ethnic kinship between the Tamils of southern India and Sri Lanka has 
been evoked in both primordial terms of a common linguistic and religious 
heritage, and historical mythology,10 and in the more instrumental sense of a 
shared political imperative of safeguarding Tamil identity from domineering 
external forces—in the case of Sri Lanka, from aggressive Sinhalese nationalism, 
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and in Tamil Nadu through opposition to a perceived Hindi-speaking national 
hegemony. The two main ethnonationalist parties in Tamil Nadu, the Dravida 
Munetra Kazhagam (DMK) and the All India Dravida Munetra Kazhagam 
(AIADMK), one or the other of which has governed at the State level since 1967, 
have been keen exponents of nationalist rhetoric in these veins. State Chief 
Ministers drawn from these parties have taken center stage at “World Tamil 
Conferences” celebrating a so-called golden age of Tamil civilization—the semi-
mythologized Sangam era when culture flourished under the patronage of warrior 
kings whose lands encompassed present-day southern India and northern Sri 
Lanka.11 As well as this evocation of cultural nationalism, the suffering of Sri 
Lankan Tamils un- der majoritarian governments and during civil conflict has 
functioned as an important rallying point for ethnonationalism in Tamil Nadu.12 
The Indian state has faced numerous challenges of ethnoregional separatism, 
including in the Tamil-speaking regions of the south where, through-    out the 
Freedom Struggle and the postcolonial period,  the  Dravidian movement agitated 
towards the creation of an independent  state  of  Dravida  Nadu.13 One approach 
to these challenges by the Indian central state has been what Chadda terms 
“relational control”: the need for constant negotiation and accommodation 
between the “supranational state and its ethnonational units.”14 Within this 
approach, measures such as the reorganization of States along linguistic lines in 
1956, and the creation of new States or autonomous regions have aimed to 
appease separatists’ calls for increased political representation and to limit future 
demands. Prohibitive measures have  been applied too though. A 1963 
constitutional amendment granted the legislature power to “penalise any 
individual who questioned the sovereignty and territorial integrity of India,”15 
while military force has also been deployed, notably in Kashmir and against Sikh-
separatists in the Punjab.16 Separatist demands in Tamil south India have largely 
been negotiated through concessionary measures, such as the establishment of 
the Tamil-language State of Madras in 1956 (renamed Tamil Nadu in 1969).17 It 
has been convincingly argued that India’s tacit support for the Sri Lankan Tamil  
separatist  movement in the early years of the island’s conflict was motivated by a 
desire to maintain regional hegemony, but the Tamil issue, if nothing else, 
provided a useful facade for this endeavor and, later, enabled the Indian 
government to claim it was compelled to  intervene  in  Sri  Lanka  in  order  to  
avoid  a resurgence of  separatism  in Tamil  Nadu,  in line with the relational 
control  model.18  In    a 1989 speech defending India’s deployment of the Indian 
Peace Keeping  Force (IPKF) to northern Sri Lanka, J. N. Dixit, Indian High 
Commissioner to  Sri Lanka from 1985–1989, claims: 
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Tamil citizens of India felt that if we did not rise in support of the Tamil cause in Sri 
Lanka, we are not standing by our own Tamils, and if that is so then in the Tamil 
psyche the question arose, is there any relevance or validity of our being part of a 
large Indian political identity, if our very deeply held sentiments are not 
respected?19  
Both the DMK and the AIADMK openly supported Sri Lankan Tamil separatist 
groups throughout the 1980s. M. G. Ramachandran, founder of the AIADMK and 
Tamil Nadu Chief Minster for three terms between 1977 and 1987, publicly backed 
the LTTE and formed close relationships with its leadership. Similar backing was 
extended by the DMK towards the Tamil Eelam Liberation Organization (TELO), 
before switching support to the LTTE who had emerged as the dominant separatist 
force.20 This support was relatively politically unproblematic for the Tamil Nadu 
ethnonationalist parties up until 1987, when Rajiv Gandhi’s government and the J. 
R. Jayewardene-led Government  of Sri Lanka signed  the  Indo-Sri  Lanka  Accord,  
leading  to  the deployment of the IPKF. Despite their  peacekeeping  mission,  the  
Indian  forces  were  soon engaged in an aggressive counterinsurgency role. The 
forces’ presence    in northern Sri Lanka between 1987 and 1990 was marred by 
civilian massacres, rapes, disappearances, and torture of suspected LTTE cadres,21 
with Indian troops’ failure to disarm the LTTE and the huge monetary cost of the 
intervention leading Gandhi’s opponents to label the deployment “India’s 
Vietnam.”22 In contrast to the early-mid 1980s, open support for the LTTE by the 
Tamil Nadu ethnonationalist parties was now unacceptable to New Delhi,  and 
between 1988 and 1991, the DMK were twice dismissed from the Tamil Nadu State 
Assembly by central government, ostensibly as a consequence of  their failure to 
control LTTE activity in the State.23 
Political instrumentalism also came into play during this period in influencing the 
Tamil ethnonationalist parties’ response to the ongoing violence in Sri Lanka. Since 
the late 1960s, these parties have engaged in a code- pendent relationship with 
national parties, in particular Congress, by trading cooperation in the Lok Sabha for 
support (or agreement not to stand in particular seats) in State elections. For much 
of the 1980s and early 1990s, Congress  worked  with  the  AIADMK,  “divid[ing]  
the  legislative  and  parliamentary seats in the State in such a way that the 
AIADMK won power in Tamil Nadu while the Congress took the majority of seats 
for Parliament,”24 following similar deals between Congress and the DMK during 
the 1970s. With the prevalence of governance by a coalition in New Delhi 
throughout the 1990s and 2000s, the main Tamil Nadu parties have emerged as 
key players in central governments’ survival, and their support was rewarded with 
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influential cabinet posts. Following the 2004 general election, for instance, the 
DMK and its alliance of smaller Dravidian parties formed the third largest party in 
the victorious Congress-led United Progressive Alliance, with members holding 6 of 
the 28 cabinet posts, including the portfolio for finance.25 In the late 1980s, 
competition between the DMK and AIADMK for the lucrative position of favored 
Congress-partner mediated criticism of the IPKF deployment, despite the clear 
suffering of Tamil civilians under the occupation,26 and when Congress allied with 
the AIADMK for the 1989 parliamentary election, Karunanidhi’s past vocal support 
for the LTTE and criticism of the IPKF was used as a stick to beat him by both 
Congress and his local AIADMK opponents.27 This schism between the Tamil Nadu 
ethnopolitical elite and   the Sri Lankan Tamil separatist cause culminated in the 
aftermath of the assassination of Rajiv Gandhi by an LTTE suicide bomber in May 
1991, during an election rally in the town of Sriperumbudur, near Chennai28—a 
direct retaliation to the IPKF deployment under Gandhi’s premiership. The overt 
support for Sri Lankan Tamil militants that had proved disadvantageous to Tamil 
Nadu politicians in the IPKF era now became unthinkable. Again, the AIADMK-
Congress alliance sought to blame Karunanidhi and his former ad- ministration’s 
tolerance of LTTE activities in Tamil Nadu for the assassination, contributing to the 
DMK’s resounding defeat to the AIADMK in the June 1991 State Assembly 
elections.29 
Over the next two decades though, Tamil Nadu’s ethnonationalist elites again 
rallied to the Sri Lankan Tamil cause and have robustly criticized Sri Lankan military 
actions. In 2006, Sri Lankan military air raids struck an orphanage and a school in a 
Tamil-majority region, drawing strong public condemnation of the Government of 
Sri Lanka from both the DMK and AIADMK. When publicly rebuffed by the Sri 
Lankan authorities, Karunanidhi stated; “if Tamils condemning the killing of their 
Tamil brethren was dubbed a mistake, then they [the DMK] would continue to 
commit it.”30  More recently, reports    of abuses committed by the Sri Lankan 
military during their 2008/2009 offensive against the LTTE sparked protests across 
Tamil Nadu, and in June 2010, protestors took to the streets of Chennai in 
opposition to a three-day visit to  India by the Sri Lankan  President Mahinda  
Rajapaksa.31  Matching  this  public mood, the then 87-year-old Karunanidhi 
embarked on a  hunger  strike,32 while the leaders of both main ethnonationalist  
parties  sparked  controversy with remarks interpreted as supportive of separatist 
militancy: Karunanidhi’s description of the late LTTE commander, Vellupillai 
Prabhakaran,  as  “my good friend”33 and AIADMK leader J. Jayalalithaa’s 2009 
election rally pledge that, if her alliance were to win power, it would lobby for the 
deployment of the Indian army to ensure the establishment of a Tamil homeland 
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in Sri Lanka—an endeavor she compared to Indira Gandhi’s military support for    
the secession of Bangladesh in 1971 and a strikingly bold assertion given the 
disastrous course of India’s previous military involvement in the island.34 
Having provided some brief historical and political context on the relationship 
between the Tamil Nadu ethnonationalist parties and Sri Lankan Tamil nationalist 
movement, the remainder of this article turns its attention to the specific case of 
the Sri Lankan Tamil refugees in the state. Beginning with an explanation of the 
two strands of theorization in the refugee studies literature commonly employed 
in accounts of ethnic kin refugee movement and settlement and relating these to 
the actualities of the Tamil Nadu case, I go on to suggest a modified version of the 
triadic nexus model as a more useful framework for analysis. 
ETHNIC KINSHIP AS INDICATOR OF FAVORABLE REFUGEE RECEPTION 
The common ethnicity between Tamils in India and Sri Lanka, and as such between 
the refugees and the Tamil Nadu host, is emblematic of a wider tendency within 
the Indian context for refugees to share ethnic kinship with sections of the host 
population. The majority of the approximately 400,000 refugees35 within India  
originate  in  neighboring  states  and  are  concentrated in border areas where 
their nominal ethnic kin also reside.36 The Chakma, an indigenous people of 
Bangladesh’s Chittagong Hill Tracts share a transborder “Jumma” (hill tribe) 
identity with indigenous peoples of the northeast Indian State of Tripura, where 
they have sought shelter from state-endorsed land alienation in their homeland 
since the 1970s. Similarly, the Lhotshampa (ethnic Nepalese) have fled Bhutan for 
the Indian States of Sikkim and northern West Bengal—areas that also have a 
substantial ethnic-Nepalese population,   and Chin refugees from Burma share 
ethnolinguistic commonalities with indigenous peoples in the north-eastern Indian 
States of Mizoram and Ma- nipur.37 A major refugee group, and perhaps the best 
known internationally thanks to the location of the Dalai Lama’s Government in 
Exile at Dharamasala in Himachal Pradesh, are Tibetans. While these refugees are 
not the ethnic kin of the local host population in Himachal Pradesh where their 
numbers are greatest, there  are  strong  linguistic  and  cultural  links  with  
peoples of India’s high Himalayan regions (for instance, in the Ladakh area of 
Jammu and Kashmir), and Tibetan refugees have historically been included in  the  
ethnic kinship discourse, with Nehru describing Tibet as “culturally speaking... an  
offshoot  of  India”  in  a  1959  speech  to  the  Lok  Sabha  intended to legitimize 
India’s admittance of the refugees.38 As such, and as Oberoi notes, refugees in 
India are rarely the “uncomplicated ‘Other.’”39 
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Examples from the refugee studies literature identify ethnic kinship be- tween 
refugees and hosts as a key indicator of positive  receptivity.  Milner argues that 
“the importance of ethnic affinity cannot be overstated. If a host population 
perceives the incoming refugees as “one of us,” positive and generous conceptions 
of distributive justice will apply,”40 while Kunz contends that “perhaps no other 
factor has more influence on the satisfactory resettlement of the refugee then 
cultural  compatibility  between  background  and the society which is 
confronted.”41  This argument is illustrated through      a reference to the flight of 
Pashtun Afghans into northern  Pakistan,  Issaq  Somali in Djibouti, Mozambicans in 
Malawi, and ethnic Turk Bulgarians in Turkey,42 with further examples including 
Liberian Khran in Cote D’Ivoire, Kakwa Sudanese, Bantu Rwandan and Congolese 
refugees in Uganda, and Kosovan Albanians in Albania.43  It  must  be  noted,  
however,  that  a  number of the studies cited above focus on receptivity to 
refugees by members        of host communities themselves, often within  a  highly  
localized  context,  rather than responses at an official level. While refugees’ host 
population co- ethnics may exert pressure on governments to adopt a favorable 
response  towards refugees, the suggestion that this  is  an  inevitable  process  
rests  on  the assumption that refugees’ co-ethnics possess sufficient social or 
political capital to be heard at the central government level. Milner’s  observation 
that  “if refugees are seen as members of an ‘out-group’, they are likely to receive 
a hostile reception”44 and that leads to the possibility that such “out-groups” are 
not necessarily foreigners but may comprise members of the host citizenry itself. 
In multinational states, local majorities may also be national minorities, themselves 
marginalized or engaged in an antagonistic relation- ship with the central state, 
and as such their co-ethnicity with refugees may have no favorable bearing on 
official reception and may even engender hostile treatment. 
Returning to the Indian context, this possibility is illustrated through examination 
of parliamentary references to the Chakma refugees, whose indigenous co-ethnics 
in Tripura are a small minority  within  India,  them-  selves implicated in a 
separatist  struggle  with  the  central  state.  Reflecting  this context, parliamentary 
references to the refugees within the sample data     are concerned entirely with 
the refugees’ alleged role as conduits for funds   and arms between cross-border 
insurgents in the Chittagong Hill Tracts and Tripura. Members of Parliament 
describe how “Tripura is being used by the extremists in the northeast as a 
corridor for smuggling arms [and] ammunitions”45 and employ evocative language 
in depicting those who “permeate, percolate strathily [sic]. They never inform the 
Government. They never inform anybody. They take any route and then they 
permeate into the regions where they find themselves secure ... anybody can  
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cross  the  borders  any time, bring in arms.”46 Kinship between refugees and the 
local host population is acknowledged by these parliamentarians but is presented 
as further evidence of the threat posed by the refugees’ presence: “they have to 
be segregated and they should not be allowed to mingle with the local pop- 
ulation,”47  while a representative of the Ministry of Home Affairs describes   the 
challenge of monitoring the refugees’ movements; “[they] are able to mingles [sic] 
easily with the local population due to ethnic and linguistic similarities.”48 
As is the general case with India’s indigenous peoples, the Chakma refugees’ 
Jumma co-ethnics reside mainly in remote rural areas, exercise neither significant 
electoral nor economic power and exist largely on the periphery of public life. In 
contrast, the Sri Lankan Tamil refugees’ Indian ethnic kin are both a local majority 
in the area of refugee settlement and a significant population body within the 
Indian state as a whole. As a large, populous, and relatively industrialized State, 
Tamil Nadu exerts substantial electoral and economic clout on the national stage, 
both in terms of the aforementioned role of the State’s ethnonationalist parties as 
central government coalition partners and through its major stake in India’s post-
1991 economic development. Tamil Nadu  possessed  the  second  largest  
economy  of any Indian State in 2011/2012 and records higher than average 
economic growth,49 while its strong links with Singapore and Malaysia are crucial 
to the success of the Indian government’s “Look East” policy that promotes greater 
integration with the economies of East and Southeast Asia.50 
Taking this context alongside the other empirical examples found in the refugee 
studies literature, it is fair to hypothesize that the attitude of Tamil Nadu’s 
ethnonationalist parties towards the refugees would be sympathetic. This 
expectation is borne out to an extent. India is a  non-signatory  to  the  United 
Nations Refugee Convention and has  no  national  refugee  law,  leaving the 
government free to exhibit striking inconsistency in its dealings with different 
incoming groups.51 Along with Tibetans, Sri Lankan Tamils are considered the 
refugee group in receipt of the most favorable treatment from the Indian 
authorities. They have been largely freely admitted to India, and once registered 
with the authorities, they have the option of living in government-    run camps and 
receiving subsidized food, cooking fuel, and a cash dole.52 In contrast, other 
groups of forced migrants, including the Bangladeshi Chakma, Burmese Chin, and 
Bhutanese Lhotshampa are considered illegal aliens and receive no official 
assistance.53 Although some  nongovernmental  organizations (NGOs) have 
criticized conditions in Tamil Nadu’s refugee camps,54  these criticisms are 
tempered by expressions of gratitude towards the Indian authorities, and an 
  
10 
 
 
 
acknowledgment that the bulk of camps are situated in depressed rural areas 
where local communities also  face  significant  livelihood insecurity.55 A 
representative of the Organisation for Eelam Refugees’ Rehabilitation (OFERR), the 
primary NGO working in the Tamil Nadu camps,   is quoted in the international 
media as saying; “We  do not complain about     the conditions because just next to 
us there are Indian citizens who don’t get even what we get,”56 while the Mission 
of the United States Committee for Refugees and Immigrants (USCRI) has 
described India’s response to the Sri Lankan Tamil refugees “as generous as for any 
group in Asia.”57 The repatriation from 1992 of around 30,000 refugees attracted 
accusations of coercion     by international NGOs, but the program was suspended 
in 1995 and UNHCR  was allowed to maintain a monitoring presence in Tamil 
Nadu, appearing satisfied that subsequent repatriations were voluntary and  
upheld  the  principle of non-refoulement,58 although the agency continues to 
complain that it is forbidden from directly accessing the refugee  camps,  so  must  
rely  on local partners to monitor conditions inside.59 
The relatively generous reception extended to the Sri Lankan Tamil  refugees has 
been attributed by observers to the aforementioned co-ethnicity between the 
refugees and the Tamil Nadu host: Oberoi’s assertion, for in- stance, that the 
“strong bond of kinship” has acted as an “important motivating factor in the 
formulation of a generous asylum policy,” as within “the domestic politics of the 
Indian polity ... New Delhi cannot afford to alien-      ate the vast population of 
Indian Tamils.”60 Parliamentary transcripts reveal  that representatives of Tamil 
Nadu’s main ethnonationalist parties (and their smaller affiliates) have regularly 
lobbied central government on the issue of     the refugees. These Parliamentarians 
advocate  an  improvement  in conditions  in the refugee camps, calling on the  
government  to  increase  food subsidies and the quota of places for refugee 
children in schools.61 In a joint statement, representatives of the AIADMK and 
their affiliate party the M. G. R. Anna Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (MGR ADMK) 
argue: 
The existing basic facilities like food, shelter and health need to be in- creased. 
A humanitarian approach is needed ... . Adequate financial al- location to 
provide basic amenities to these people is the foremost need of this hour ... . 
[We] urge upon Central Govt. [sic] to allocate more funds to help these people 
to have their decent life in refugee camps.62 
This sympathetic attitude towards the refugees is also manifested through calls on 
the government to intervene in the Sri Lankan conflict, in order to alleviate the 
suffering of the Tamil civilians who are compelled to seek “solace, succor [sic] and 
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asylum”63 in India. Marumalarchi Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (MDMK) leader 
Vaiko implores the House to consider the situation of Sri Lankan Tamils in terms of 
“universal human right [sic],” contesting that the situation is “worse than what has 
happened in Bosnia.” He recounts, “with a heavy heart and terrible agony,” the 
drowning of 47 refugees attempt- ing to reach India by boat, who he alleges were 
bombarded by Sri Lankan military aircraft, and urges the government to “ask the 
Government of Sri Lanka to stop forthwith the genocidal attacks on these innocent 
Tamils.”64 Speaking in the same debate, an AIADMK member states: “[T]here is no 
safety for the lives of the innocent Tamil people in Jaffna area. Some of them want 
to save themselves by coming to Tamil Nadu as refugees.” He goes on to advocate 
“some official measures to help those refugees who are all willing to come over to 
India ... some authorized vessel may be arranged and pathetic deaths may be 
prevented in the mid-sea.”65 Ethnic kinship between the Tamils of Tamil Nadu and 
Sri Lanka is presented directly and evocatively in the parliamentary transcripts. For 
instance, description of the refugees as “our kith and kin” and paraphrasing of the 
exalted Tamil nationalist leader and DMK founder C. N. Annadurai in response to 
the aforementioned drowning incident: “the sea water is getting salty because of 
the tears of the Tamils.”66 More recently, the former DMK-led State 
administration67 petitioned central government to grant Indian citizenship to the 
refugees,68 although a representative  of  the  Ministry  of  Home  Affairs  states  
that  “no  such  proposal  is under consideration.”69 
REFUGEES AS A SECURITY THREAT 
But such expressions of co-ethnic  solidarity  are  not  the  whole  story  of  Tamil 
Nadu’s ethnonationalist parties’ engagement with the Sri Lankan Tamil refugees. 
As described above, the assassination of Rajiv Gandhi  in  1991  marked a shift in 
the Tamil Nadu parties’ response to the LTTE. Sympathy    for the LTTE and support 
for the separatist cause (or the perception of sup- port) was no longer compatible 
with political participation at State or central levels, as the DMK found to its cost. 
The aftermath of the assassination also marked the nadir of relations between the 
Tamil Nadu authorities and the Sri Lankan Tamil refugees. It was alleged that 
refugees registered in Tamil Nadu were amongst the plotters of the 
assassination,70 and the incoming AIADMK administration adopted a reactionary 
stance that effectively placed    all refugees under suspicion of cooperation with  
the  militants.  Speaking  in May 1991, the newly elected Tamil Nadu Chief Minister 
Jayalalithaa said, “I  appeal, rather demand, that the centre should take immediate 
action so that  all Sri Lankan Tamils are sent back.”71 Central government was left 
to speak as the voice of moderation, with Law Minister Subramanian Swamy 
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replying, “over ninety-nine percent of the Sri Lankans in India are refugees, and we 
are not in favour of any deportation. It is only the remaining one percent who   
should be nabbed.”72 Under the AIADMK administration restrictive measures 
were  imposed  to  negate  the  perceived  threat  posed  by  the  refugees  and   to 
encourage their repatriation: Child refugees’ access to education was rescinded, 
international NGOs were barred from accessing the refugee camps, high-security 
“special camps” (de facto prisons where human rights abuses were allegedly rife) 
were introduced for those refugees suspected of militant involvement, and a large-
scale repatriation program was initiated.73 
Scholarship reports a global tendency towards the equation of refugees with 
disruption and insecurity; a shift from consideration of refugees as passive victims 
to “a sinister transnational threat to national security.”74 The phenomenon of the 
refugee warrior is well documented in relation to Afghan mujahidin in Pakistan, 
Nicaraguan contras in Honduras and Rwandan genocidaires  in the refugee camps 
of Eastern Congo, to give just a few exam-   ples.75 As well as this role in the 
prolongation of conflict in the home state, refugees are constituted as a threat to 
stability in the host state through their potential  to  spread  insurgency  and  
conflict:  “Refugees  extend  rebel  social networks across space through their own 
geographic mobility, as well as by establishing links, sharing information, and 
providing resources to domestic actors with compatible aims.”76 There are 
additional economic sources of conflict between refugees and  host  communities.  
Aid  provision  to  refugees by states, supranational bodies, or NGOs can fuel 
resentment amongst struggling local populations, and refugees may depress local 
wages and increase competition for scarce  resources,  as  in  the  arid  Dadaab  
region  of  northern Kenya, where the settlement of huge numbers of Somali 
refugees has severely exacerbated existing shortages of water and  firewood.77  In  
cases  where refugees originate in neighboring states and share  kinship  with  
sections of a multiethnic receiving state’s host population, their arrival may 
aggravate existing tensions between groups by disrupting established or 
precarious power balances.78 Grievances of host-state ethnic kin may be 
consolidated or exacerbated through  outrage  at  refugees’  mistreatment  in  the 
origin state, or in some cases their own government’s poor treatment of   the 
refugees or inaction over the issues prompting their displacement.79 Host 
governments may also fear refugees’ material involvement in conflicts and  their 
potential to facilitate cross-border movements of militant cadres, arms, and funds. 
This fear is  expressed  by  Indian  Parliamentarians  in  relation  to the 
aforementioned Chakma case, where the refugees’ Indian co-ethnics are 
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unquestionably members of Milner’s “out-groups”80 in the broader Indian 
national context. 
But examination of the Tamil Nadu ethnonationalist parties’ responses    to the Sri 
Lankan Tamil refugees during their long period of exile in the State problematizes 
attempts to apply  this  securitization  framework  as  explanation for the 
AIADMK’s turn to hostility towards the refugees in the post-Rajiv Gandhi 
assassination period. The assassination was by no means the first in- stance of Sri 
Lankan Tamil separatist-associated violence rocking peace and security in the 
State. As early as 1982, LTTE leader Prabhakaran and Uma Maheswaran, head of 
the rival separatist movement the People’s Liberation Organisation of Tamil Eelam 
(PLOTE), were involved in a shoot-out in the   busy Pondy Bazaar area  of  Chennai,  
and  in  August  1984,  an  attempt  by  the Tamil Eelam Army (TEA) to blow up 
Colombo airport went awry, with     the bomb instead detonating inside  Chennai’s  
international  airport,  killing  30 passengers and airport staff.81 If the violence of 
the Rajiv Gandhi assassination prompted a shift towards hostile treatment  of  the  
refugees  as  proxy militants, why did the wounding of civilian bystanders on 
Chennai’s streets and the death and destruction at the  international airport not 
prompt a comparable response? 
KIN STATES AND THE TRIADIC NEXUS 
I have shown that neither of the possible outcomes of ethnic kin refugee situations 
outlined thus far can satisfactorily account for the complex realities of the Tamil 
Nadu case. The remainder of this article suggests an alternative framework of 
analysis, drawing on the sociological literature around kin state nationalism and kin 
migration. As well as shedding light on the particularities of the Tamil Nadu case, 
this application may also yield broader insights into the impact of substate 
nationalism on the political dynamics surrounding ethnic kin migration in the 
contexts of other multinational states. 
Kin states whose citizenry’s ethnic kin form a minority in another, usually 
neighboring, state have concerned scholars of nationalism, with Brubaker’s 
influential conception of the  triadic  nexus  providing  a  helpful  visualization  of 
the relationship between states and national minorities. Within this model, three 
“interlocking and interacting” modes of nationalism are defined. The first of these 
is the “nationalizing nationalism” or a state where a “core nation defined in ethno-
cultural terms and sharply distinguished from the citizenry as  a  whole”  is  
conceived  as  the  “legitimate  ‘owner’  of  the  state.”  In  direct antagonism  is  
the  “external  national  homeland”  or  a  second  state  engaging in transborder 
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nationalism by construing a minority excluded from the “core  nation”  of  the  first  
state  as  their  ethnic  kin  and  “fellow  members  of a transborder nation,” and, as 
such, claiming that “their rights and responsibilities  vis-a`-vis  ethno-national  kin  
transcend  the  boundaries  of  territory and citizenship. Thirdly, there are “national 
minorities” or a marginalized minority within the nationalizing state and the ethnic 
kin of citizens of the external national homeland.82 The kin state phenomenon has 
been explored  in particular depth in relation to the post-Soviet states of Eastern 
Europe    and Central Asia83 but has global salience, and it is straightforward to see 
how the triadic nexus model can be mapped onto the South Asian region   that is 
the focus of this study. The majoritarian nationalism of Sri Lanka, whereby 
Sinhalese identity is construed as synonymous with national identity to the 
exclusion of the Sri Lankan Tamil national minority is viewable   in terms of a 
nationalizing nationalism, while Tamil Nadu fulfils the role     of the external 
national homeland through the Tamil Nadu ethnonationalist parties’  claim  making  
vis-a`-vis  their  marginalized  Sri  Lankan  Tamil  ethnic kin. 
There are several points of alignment between the empirical examples drawn from 
the kin state literature and the Sri Lanka-Sri Lankan Tamil-Tamil Nadu nexus. 
Firstly, discussions of migration within this literature have generally centered on 
ethnic return migration; the return to a putative homeland by persons, or the 
descendants of persons, dispersed through migration or cut off from the 
homeland’s territory by the redrawing of borders—the migration of Jews to Israel 
and ethnic Germans from Eastern Europe to Germany being archetypal 
examples.84 While the Tamils of Sri Lanka and Tamil Nadu share a nominal ethnic 
identity, an application of the ethnic return model to the refugees’ situation is 
problematic, as the classic scenario of mismatch between citizenship and 
nationhood in the home state is disrupted by Sri Lankan  Tamil  nationalist  claim  
making  vis-a`-vis  the  Sri  Lankan  state.  The historical discourse of Sri Lankan 
Tamil nationalism strongly roots the Tamil people in the territory of present-day Sri 
Lanka. To suggest a homeland in Tamil Nadu undermines this and legitimizes 
opposing Sinhalese nationalist narratives that depict the Tamils as Indian invaders 
who subjugated the Sinhalese population. Rather, Sri Lankan Tamil nationalist 
discourse presents the northern Sri Lankan city of Jaffna as an important center of 
an ancient greater-Tamil kingdom, equal in heritage and riches to the historic Tamil 
cities of southern India; a claim hotly contested by Sinhalese nationalists.85 
Indeed, the group who could be more properly considered ethnic return migrants, 
Tamils of Indian origin, have historically been excluded from Sri Lankan Tamil 
nationalism despite being amongst the first victims of chauvinistic governance 
under the 1949 Citizenship Act that disenfranchized the community. Nonetheless, 
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at times of amicable relations between the Tamil Nadu authorities and the 
refugees, the latter (both Sri Lankan Tamils and the smaller number of Tamils of 
Indian origin) are positioned in terms reminiscent of ethnic return migrants, most 
notably in recent calls for conferral of Indian citizenship. 
The observations that the nationalist agendas of kin states and transborder ethnic 
constituents do not necessarily converge, and that the positions    of the actors in 
the triadic relationship are not fixed but are rather “arenas  of struggle,”86 are also 
salient to this article’s case. Conceptions of an essential Tamil ethnic identity and 
subsequent inevitability of “intimately related” transborder ethnonationalisms 
contradict a historical actuality of the distinct development of Tamil nationalist 
movements in Sri Lanka and India with minimal contact or intercooperation.87 The 
early 20th-century Indian Tamil separatist vision of Dravida Nadu incorporated 
Ceylon88 only so far as Tamils of Indian origin were concerned, and the Tamil 
ethnonationalist parties continued to focus solely on this group in their attention 
to events in Sri Lanka  in the early postcolonial period. Meanwhile, Ceylonese Tamil 
nationalism asserted distinctiveness from the Tamil region of southern India by 
elevating a unique Jaffna culture.89 It was only with the violent attacks on Sri 
Lankan Tamils from the 1970s and the outbreak of civil war in 1983 that a broader 
conception of transborder ethnic kinship was adopted.90 Recently, the Tamil Nadu 
ethnonationalist parties’ pronouncements of support and sympathy for their  
beleaguered  ethnic  kin  have  been  dismissed  as  “crocodile  tears”  by some Sri 
Lankan Tamil nationalists, who resent the political one-upmanship the issue 
appears to represent to Tamil Nadu’s rival politicians. The DMK’s demand for 
Indian citizenship for the refugees has been criticized by the  same voices as 
undermining displaced Tamils’ right to reclaim their homes in Sri Lanka, instead 
encouraging them to “forsake them forever” through permanent settlement in 
India.91 
SUBSTATE NATIONS AS KIN “STATES” 
As indicated at this article’s outset, there are important distinctions between  the 
Tamil Nadu case and other examples within the kin state literature. While    in 
most cases the kin state or external national homeland is a sovereign state      in its 
own right, Tamil Nadu is a substate actor  within  the  larger  political entity of 
India. The kin state literature acknowledges the  potential  for  external influences 
to divert kin states from ethnopolitical concerns: Brubaker highlights how “ethnic 
co-nationals may be precipitously abandoned when geopolitical goals require 
this,”92 while Smith proposes a transfiguration of the relational triad into a 
“quadratic nexus” through the addition of a fourth actor in the form  of  
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supranational  institutions  such  as  the  European  Union or United Nation, who 
may influence or counter the ethnopolitical impulses of states.93 Undoubtedly, 
bilateral and regional concerns have shaped Indian responses to the conflict in Sri 
Lanka, notably  through  fears  that  the  now close relationship between Colombo 
and Beijing94 threatens Indian regional hegemony. The desire to preempt the 
intervention of an alternative  foreign power was a key factor in India’s decision to 
deploy the IPKF in 1987,95 while Indian intelligence agencies’ cooperation with the 
Sri Lankan military during the 2008/2009 offensive and, postwar, New Delhi’s 
initial reluctance to support calls for an international investigation into war crimes 
can be attributed to a desire to maintain positive relations  with  the  Rajapaksa  
regime  in  the face of the perceived Chinese threat.96 In a case like Tamil Nadu, 
where a substate nationalism operates in the role of proxy kin state  or  external  
national homeland, the impulse towards co-ethnic solidarity with  transborder  
ethnic constituents must be negotiated in relation to the internal political 
dynamics of the broader state entity within which the substate unit is 
incorporated, with this broader entity’s own nationalizing project and bilateral 
considerations thus shaping responses. 
The Tamil Nadu ethnonationalist parties’ response to their Sri Lankan Tamil ethnic 
kin is influenced then by the demands  and  priorities  of  the  central Indian state, 
with which these parties  have  an  interdependent  political relationship. As such, 
an ethnonationalist agenda of support for Sri  Lankan Tamil kin can only be 
followed unproblematically  when  this aligns with (or at the very least does not 
disrupt) the priorities of the central government—during the early-mid 1980s 
when both the Indian central government and the Tamil Nadu ethnonationalist 
parties supported Sri Lankan  Tamil separatist groups, for example. But when these  
positions  have  di-  verged, ambitions for central government-endorsed State-level 
power and influential national coalition partnership have been prioritized over co-
ethnic solidarity. The AIADMK’s wholesale identification of the refugees as proxy 
militants and terrorists following Rajiv Gandhi’s assassination represents a critical 
moment, when any lingering sympathies towards the LTTE  in  New Delhi 
shattered, and to maintain a  purely  ethnonationalist  stance  (conceivably viewed 
as supportive of the LTTE) represented political suicide for the Tamil Nadu parties. 
Jayalalithaa’s attack on the refugees at this moment is situated within this shift and 
was motivated by the AIADMK’s desire to consolidate its position as a loyal and 
dependable partner of Congress and to capitalize on the misfortunes of the DMK, 
whose failure to realign their position on Sri Lankan separatism to central priorities 
and sentiment during this period cost their leadership of the State Assembly. The 
observation that, for kin  state  elites,  “kinship  is  as  much  a  function  of  political  
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instrumentalism as cultural bonding”97 is relevant here. Despite  the  passion  and  
hyperbole with which it had been  evoked  in  public  pronouncements  and  
parliamentary proceedings, transborder co-ethnic solidarity was readily dropped at 
a moment when its political expediency waned. 
This shift was not permanent though. The parliamentary transcripts examined in 
this study (and encompassing the period from 1995 to 2010) do contain references 
to the Sri Lankan Tamil refugees as a security threat: A representative of the 
Ministry of Home Affairs states the need “to safeguard against the possible strain 
that Sri Lankan refugees can cause on [the] security scenario,” explaining how 
“central and State agencies keep watch over the activities in refugee camps,”98 
how questions are raised around the impact of the refugees’ presence in India on 
“social and political problems,”99 and how  the  arrival  of  refugees  from  Sri  
Lanka  is  equated  with  “LTTE  people coming into India.”100 More recently, in 
April 2009, concerns are raised that LTTE cadres fleeing advancing government 
troops in northern Sri Lanka may   be “infiltrating” India amongst refugees.101 
However, these remarks originate outside the Tamil Nadu political sphere,  with  
the  quoted  examples  emanating from Congress members representing the  
States  of  Rajasthan,  Haryana, and Orissa. For Tamil Nadu politicians at the center, 
the discourse surrounding the refugees has returned to one of sympathy and co-
ethnic solidarity (as shown in the quotations from parliamentary  proceedings  
provided  earlier  in the article). While refugees suspected of LTTE affiliation have 
remained detained in special camps, more generalized associations of the refugees 
with militancy, as expressed by Jayalalithaa in 1991, are no longer found within      
the public discourse of Tamil Nadu’s ethnonational political elites. 
CONCLUSION 
The concern of this article has been to question how theoretical models around 
ethnic kin migration and transborder ethnonationalisms may be employed in 
accounting for the responses of Tamil Nadu’s ethnonationalist par- ties to Sri 
Lankan Tamil refugees. Numerous cases presented in the refugee studies literature 
suggest that ethnic kinship between refugee and host indicates favorable 
reception and assistance. The particular circumstances of Tamil Nadu, where 
ethnonationalist elites have readily engaged in a public discourse of transborder 
ethnic solidarity, further strengthen the expectation of a sympathetic response 
towards these refugees. This expectation has been   met to an extent: The 
refugees’ treatment has been favorable in comparison    to other groups of forced 
migrants within  India,  parliamentary  transcripts  reveal lobbying of the central 
government by  the  Tamil  Nadu  ethnonationalist parties on  the  refugees’  
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behalf,  and  the  refugees  have  been  figured  in terms of ethnic return migration 
through political advocacy towards the conferral of Indian citizenship. However, 
this has been tempered by a period of hostility in the aftermath of Rajiv Gandhi’s 
assassination, when the same co-ethnic elites figured the refugees as a dangerous 
and disruptive presence. Although a body  of  literature  theorizes  host  states’  
perceptions  of ethnic kin refugees as harbingers of war and  instability,  this  
cannot  ac- count for the unusual phenomenon represented by the Tamil Nadu  
case,  whereby  the  securitization  discourse  has  emanated  not  from  members  
of  an opposing or domineering group  within  the  multiethnic  host  state  but  
rather from the refugees’ ethnic kin elite who have previously, and since, engaged 
in the apparently contradictory discourse of co-ethnic solidarity and support. 
Moving to the kin state literature, the triadic nexus model is somewhat remolded 
by the Sri Lanka-Sri Lankan Tamil-Tamil Nadu case through the addition of the 
state of India that encircles the point of the triad occupied by    the external 
national homeland—Tamil Nadu.  Despite this reconfiguration, this model’s 
recognition of ethnicity and ethnic kinship as a fluid concept, instrumentally 
evoked by elites in accordance with broader operational con- texts and external 
influences, is revealing. In a case such  as  Tamil  Nadu,  where a substate 
nationalism occupies the kin state position, the source of external influence 
percolates from the bilateral or multilateral scale (as in  Smith’s “quadratic” 
model102) to the internal political dynamics of the state within which the substate 
unit is incorporated. As such, the impulse towards ethnopolitical solidarity 
suggested by the refugee studies literature is mediated by the demands of 
negotiating a relationship with the central state and developing or maintaining 
domestic political influence in accordance with the larger state unit’s own national, 
bilateral, or multilateral concerns. This leads to the possibility of a periodic 
emergence of the securitization discourse more commonly evoked by opposing 
ethnic elites. An application of    this framework to the Tamil Nadu case yields 
insights into how both of the apparently contradictory outcomes of  ethnic  kinship  
between  refugee  and  host suggested by  the  refugee  studies  literature  can  
coexist  and  accounts  for the seemingly anomalous adoption  of  the  
securitization  discourse  by  elites drawn from the refugees’ own ethnic kin 
constituency in the post-Rajiv Gandhi assassination period and the subsequent 
return to a discourse of  co-ethnic solidarity as this critical moment passed. 
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